Building governance and anti-corruption in the Philippines'conditional cash transfer program by Arulpragasam, Jehan et al.
1 www.worldbank.org
PHILIPPINE SOCIAL PROTECTION NOTE
Building Governance and 
Anti-Corruption in the Philippines’ 
Conditional Cash Transfer Program1
Jehan Arulpragasam, Luisa Fernandez, Yasuhiko Matsuda, 
Rosechin Olfindo, and Matt Stephens2
1.  Background
The Philippines is implementing a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program, which is called the 
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps). CCT program provides cash to poor households as 
long as the beneficiary households comply with the conditions of the program. Health grants are 
provided for beneficiary households with children 0-14 years old and/or with pregnant women 
with the conditions that all children 0-5 years old and the pregnant women visit health centers 
and receive services according to Department of Health (DOH) protocol, all children 6-14 years 
old undergo de-worming protocol at schools, and the household grantees (mainly women) attend 
family development sessions at least once a month. Education grants are provided for beneficiary 
households with children 6-14 years old with the conditions that the children are enrolled in primary 
or secondary school and maintain a class attendance rate of 85 percent every month.3
Launched in February 2008, the 4Ps has now become one of the largest anti-poverty and social 
protection programs in the Philippines. Following the successful implementation of CCT programs 
in other countries, the Philippines’ Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) pilot-
tested the 4Ps to 6,000 beneficiary households in four municipalities and two cities in 2007, with 
a planned target of 20,000 households. Since then, the 4Ps has expanded significantly in coverage 
and scale. The economic crises that hit after the program launching, such as the food and fuel 
price shock in mid-2008 and the global financial crisis towards the end of the year, prompted the 
government to scale-up the program to cover 376,000 households. As of January 2011, the 4Ps has 
about 1 million beneficiary households located in 782 cities and municipalities in 81 provinces in all 
17 regions in the Philippines. The program is expected to cover 2.3 million households by the end 
of 2011. 
Practical  experience  from  other  countries  suggests  that  CCT  programs  present  particular 
implementation challenges from a governance and anti-corruption perspective. CCT programs 
are administratively complex by nature as the operation covers several sectors, are usually large 
1 The Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) in CCT was financed by Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID) GAC Externally Funded Output (EFO).
2  World Bank Office Manila, the Philippines. For questions and clarifications about this note, please email to 
    jarulpragasam@worldbank.org. 
3 The health grant is PhP500 (US$11) per month per household. The education grant is PhP300 (US$7) per month per child 
in the household, up to a maximum of three children, and is provided for 10 months during the year. More   information 
on the 4Ps can be found on the 4Ps website, http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/.
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gible beneficiaries to garner political support, staff accept-
ing illegal payments from eligible or ineligible beneficiaries, 
or diversion of funds to ghost beneficiaries or other illegal 
channels. Figure 1 illustrates how an interaction between a 
claimant and a program staff can be classified as error, fraud, 
or corruption depending on their intentions. 5 Based on the 
experience of CCT programs in other countries and from the 
implementation of 4Ps so far, the risks of EFC are most like-
ly to emerge in the following areas: targeting, registration, 
compliance monitoring, payment systems, and procurement 
of service contracts (Table 1).
Moreover,  weaknesses  in  supply  and  demand  side   
capacities could severely restrict achievement of program   
outcomes. The 4Ps requires significant administrative capac-
ity of DSWD and, if controls and accountability mechanisms in 
the department are weak, the 4Ps implementation can open 
opportunities for corruption. Moreover, the rapid scale up of 
the 4Ps may pose challenges that were not obvious during 
the pilot stage. DSWD handles several other social protec-
tion programs, emergency assistance and community devel-
opment programs in addition to 4Ps that could put a strain 
to the limited number of technical staff, thereby increasing 
the risk of error. Challenges also exist on the demand side 
of the program, such as lack of knowledge on how the pro-
gram operates and the program’s eligibility criteria, which 
could increase the likelihood of manipulation of beneficiaries 
by say, having them pay a portion of grants to a local chief   
executive.
5  This definition and the illustration of EFC in Figure 1 are taken from 
Grosh et al (2008).
in  scope,  and  involve  voluminous  financial  transactions. 
Multiple actors are involved in the process, which cut across 
municipal, regional, and national levels. These factors make 
CCT programs prone to risk of error, fraud, and corruption, 
resulting in leakages. Experiences with CCT programs in other 
countries, however, suggest that preventive measures can 
be devised to minimize leakages and thus enhance impact. 
In  particular,  having  sufficient  control  and  accountability 
mechanisms is critical to minimize and manage political and 
administrative risks associated with CCT programs. 
The  importance  of  establishing  governance  and  anti-
corruption measures in 4Ps is particularly acute given the 
country context. The 4Ps operates in a political environment 
where there is high degree of corruption and where policy-
making is highly politicized.4 Government offices are marred 
by  corruption  allegations  and  government  programs,  big 
or small in terms of budget, are plagued by incidences of 
bribes. Because it involves cash transfers in such a political 
environment, the 4Ps has been particularly scrutinized by 
opposition, public, civil society and press as potentially a 
“political  gimmick”  by  the  Arroyo  administration,  having 
been  launched  before  the  national  elections.  Moreover, 
the 4Ps had to stand up to the standard criticism of cash 
transfer programs that it was a “dole out” rather than a 
development  program.  It  is  because  of  this  context  that 
embedding governance and anti-corruption element to the 
4Ps  was  additionally  critical  for  its  integrity,  success,  and 
sustainability.  
 
2.  The Risks of Error, Fraud, and Corruption in  
  Implementing the 4Ps 
Error, fraud, and corruption (EFC) can reduce the develop-
ment impact of a CCT program by reducing the amount of 
benefits that go to the poor and by eroding program integ-
rity. Error is an unintentional violation of program or benefit 
rules that results in the wrong benefit amount being paid or 
in payment to an ineligible applicant. Fraud occurs when a 
claimant deliberately makes a false statement or conceals 
or distorts relevant information regarding program eligibility 
or level of benefits. Corruption commonly involves manipu-
lation of beneficiary rosters, for example, registering ineli-
4  The Worldwide Governance Indicators 2009 estimates the Philippines 
to have a Control of Corruption unit of -0.710, which is lower than its 
Southeast  Asian  neighbors  (Singapore,  2.261;  Malaysia,  0.021;  and 
Thailand, -0.230; with higher values corresponding to better governance 
outcomes).  Likewise,  the  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  2010  of 
Transparency International estimates the Philippines to have a score of 
2.4, which is also lower than its neighbors (Singapore, 9.3; Malaysia, 4.4; 
and Thailand, 3.5).
 
Figure 1.  Tracking Error, Fraud, and Corruption3 www.worldbank.org
Recognizing these issues, DSWD, in collaboration with the 
World Bank, incorporated elements of governance and anti-
corruption in the implementation of 4Ps. Since the program’s 
inception, DSWD has worked closely with the World Bank in 
putting in place the systems required to successfully implement 
the 4Ps. Drawing from its experience with the more mature 
CCT programs particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the  World  Bank  provided  technical  assistance  to  DSWD 
with  funding  from  the  Australian  Agency  for  International 
Development  (AusAID).  The  technical  assistance  included 
Area Risks
Targeting
Inclusion and exclusion errors; households may provide false information to be eligible for 
the CCT grants (fraud); government officials or politicians may implement 4Ps in favored 
areas even if they do not satisfy the poverty criteria to gain political support or financial gain 
(corruption).
Registration
Politicians may register supporters or exclude opponents; households may not report updated 
status to keep eligibility for receiving the CCT grants.
Compliance 
monitoring
Schools and health centers may not report non-compliance of the beneficiaries with the 
conditionalities; fraud may occur in filling up of compliance verification forms; management 
information systems may be inadequate to handle compliance data resulting to intentional 
or unintentional error; compliance monitoring may overburden schools and health centers 
resulting in errors.
Payment systems
Cash grants are paid directly to the beneficiaries using cash cards. However, for areas that do not 
have automated teller machines (ATMs), bank officials may charge illegal fees to beneficiaries 
to access over-the-counter payments.
Procurement of  
service contracts
Inappropriate or inadequate specifications and terms of reference for procurement may open 
up window for corruption; delays in procurement may occur, which could result in errors (in 
encoding, processing forms, etc.).
under  taking activities that integrate control and accountability 
mechanisms in the technical design and administrative features 
of the 4Ps as well as those help improve DSWD’s governance 
and  anti-corruption  capacity  and  enhance  the  community’s 
capacity  to  oversee  program  implementation.  The  strong 
ownership of the governance and anti-corruption agenda by 
the DSWD senior officials and technical staff has significantly 
contributed to the successful initial roll out of the 4Ps while 




Table 1.  Risks of EFC in CCT Implementation   
Figure 2.  Embedding Governance and Anti-Corruption Measures in 4Ps
Supply Side
(DSWD)
Improving governance and  
anti-corruption capacity of  
DSWD through:
•  Integrity Development  
  Review:
– Corruption  Resistance 
Review





Putting in place control and 
accountability mechanisms in 4Ps:
•  Proxy-means test (PMT) based 
targeting method
•  Management information 
system
•  Monitoring and spot checks
•  Process risk mapping 
Demand Side
(4Ps beneficiaries and 
general public)
Enhancing community’s 
capacity to oversee 4Ps 
implementation through:
•  Public information 
campaign
•  Grievance redress 
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3.  Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) 
  Measures in 4Ps
The  GAC  measures  undertaken  for  4Ps  supported  the 
program’s  core  technical  design  and  the  activities  that 
enhance the program’s supply and demand side capacities. 
Figure 2 illustrates the GAC measures undertaken for 4Ps, which 
can be classified under three components: 1) CCT Program 
(4Ps), which included activities that supported the integration 
of risk-mitigating measures within core program design such as 
proxy means test (PMT) - based targeting system, management 
information system, monitoring and spot checks, and process 
risk mapping; 2) Demand Side, which supported activities that 
aim to enhance the capacity of beneficiaries and the general 
public to oversee the program implementation through public 
information  campaign  and  grievance  redress  system;  and   
3) Supply Side, which supported the strengthening of DSWD’s 
governance and anti-corruption capacity through an Integrity 
Development  Review.  The  rest  of  this  paper  describes  the 
activities undertaken under each of these components and 
their significance from a GAC perspective.
3.1.  CCT Program: 4Ps 
Proxy Means Test
DSWD created a household targeting system, which is the 
National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction 
(NHTS-PR).  With  technical  support  from  the  World  Bank, 
DSWD designed the NHTS-PR and set up the institutional 
structure needed to manage its implementation, including 
the NHTS-PR’s Project Management Office and the Operations 
Manual  that  outlines  all  the  implementation  details  of 
the  targeting  system.  The  NHTS-PR  includes  the  national 
database of poor households and a specialized Management 
Information  System  (MIS)  to  support  its  operations.  To 
guarantee data quality, DSWD worked in partnership with 
the World Bank in improving data entry application, cleaning 
of the database for possible errors and duplicities, checking 
the consistency of information in the database, and running 
validation  routines  to  control  quality.  These  activities  are 
undertaken to avoid errors that could affect the households’ 
PMT score, thereby minimizing targeting errors.6  
The 4Ps uses the PMT-based targeting system to select the 
beneficiary households and geographic targeting to select 
the  poor  areas  in  the  Philippines.  The  PMT  is  a  widely 
used  method  to  objectively  determine  whether  or  not  a 
6  For example, duplicities in the household roster increase the household 
size, which could affect eligibility. 
household is poor. This is done by statistically estimating the 
household income based on relevant proxy variables that 
are highly correlated with welfare status and discriminate 
between poor and rich households. This includes household 
composition,  education,  socio-economic  characteristics, 
housing conditions, access to basic services, assets, tenure 
status, and variables to incorporate regional variation.  The 
household is classified as poor if the estimated income is 
below  the  poverty  threshold,  and  non-poor  otherwise.7  
The PMT is combined with geographic targeting to identify 
the poor areas in the Philippines. The selection starts with 
identifying the poorest provinces based on poverty incidence 
according to the latest Family Income and Expenditure Survey 
(FIES). Within these provinces, the poorest municipalities and 
cities are selected based on the poverty incidence of Small 
Area Estimates (SAEs) at the municipal level.  In areas with 
low poverty incidence and cities, “pockets of poverty” are 
defined based on data from the Presidential Commission on 
the Urban Poor and social indicators at the local or barangay 
level.  As of January 2011, the NHTS-PR database contains 
about 10.2 million households where 4.7 million households 
were identified as poor using the PMT.
The objective and transparent methodology in selecting the 
beneficiaries and 4Ps areas helps ensure that the resources go 
to the intended beneficiaries, thereby minimizing exclusion 
and inclusion errors. Most social protection programs in the 
Philippines,  particularly  the  most  significant  ones  in  terms 
of budget, suffer from high leakages.8 An efficient targeting 
system  would  enhance  the  government’s  ability  to  design 
programs to support poor households. The lack of objective 
targeting had resulted in the proliferation of transfer programs 
which tend to have their own targeting systems. For many of 
these programs, the criteria for geographic and/or household 
targeting  are  not  transparent  or  standardized.  As  a  result, 
program targeting has been used for political purposes. This 
has tended to weaken the general credibility of government 
programs aimed at targeting the poor, and assessments of 
these programs show high under-coverage of the poor and 
high leakage to the non-poor.
7 The  poverty  thresholds  used  are  the  official  provincial  poverty 
 thresholds published by National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) in:   
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty.
8  For instance, it is estimated that about 41 percent of the untargeted 
rice  subsidy  of  the  National  Food  Authority  (NFA)  goes  to  non-poor   




Stores information from the Household Assessment Form (HAF), PMT results processed by the 
targeting MIS, and information on eligible households provided by the 4Ps MIS. From the household 
information,  this  module  produces  cross  tables  or  queries  and  helps  check  for  duplicities  of 
beneficiary households.
Registration
Validates  the  information  provided  by  households  at  the  assessment  stage.  As  some  eligible 
households may have reported false information, the registration of the beneficiaries’ information is 
done at assemblies, where household information contained in the database is verified for accuracy. 
This module produces the final list of registered beneficiary households. 
Updates
Gathers, validates, reports, and records the changes that have occurred on the status or condition 
of any member of the beneficiary household while under the program as well as all other relevant 
information that could change the eligibility of the household. This module has all the validation 
routines according to the rules established in the Operations Manual of 4Ps as well as different levels 




Serves as a monitoring system for verifying compliance of conditionalities reported by schools 
and health centers nationwide, controlling payments to beneficiary households, and generating 
managerial reports and progress indicators. This module links payments of grants to compliance of 
conditionalities. 
Payments
Controls and produces payments to beneficiaries based on reports of compliance and updated 
household information. The grants are paid directly from the government to the designated accounts 
of the beneficiaries through the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), a government depository 
bank. The grants can be withdrawn using cash cards (through ATM) or through over-the-counter 




Captures,  resolves,  and  analyzes  grievances  from  beneficiaries  and  non-beneficiaries  about 
the program. This module includes the process of filing and following-up on complaints such as 
generating forms for complaints, updating and processing the information, assigning a tracking 
number to every complaint as well as the person responsible for solving it, and producing reports 
of complaint resolution. 
Table 2.  MIS Modules
Management Information System (MIS)
To ensure the quality of information that flows in all stages 
of the 4Ps implementation process, an MIS handles the 
database  and  all  data  processing  requirements  for  the 
4Ps. Experience from other countries indicates that MIS is 
the backbone of CCT programs. The MIS for 4Ps manages all 
flows of information at different levels—national, regional, 
and  municipal  levels,  and  is  guided  by  the  Operations 
Manual for the 4Ps.9 The MIS makes use of information and 
9  The MIS is an integrated web-based system connected through a dedicated 
network  between  17  DSWD’s  regional  offices  and  its  National  Project 
Management Office (NPMO). The MIS software was developed using open 
source applications following the guidelines of government agencies in the 
Philippines. 
communications technology that handles all data processing 
requirements  and  maintains  the  database  for  4Ps,  which   
could be prone to unintentional human error if done manually. 
The MIS for 4Ps is designed to include six integrated modules 
as shown in Table 2.
Given the importance of MIS in automating the processes 
in 4Ps implementation, DSWD worked with international 
experts in developing the MIS. As the Philippines ventured 
into the CCT program with no experience in this type of 
programs, DSWD worked closely with international experts 
on CCT programs and MIS in designing the flows of operations 
for its own MIS modules such as the Updates, CVS, and GRS; 
drafting of the forms for compliance monitoring, Updates, 
and GRS; and preparing the respective modules for Updates, 
CVS, and GRS for     pilot-testing. This has been made possible 6 PHILIPPINE SOCIAL PROTECTION NOTE
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with the financial and technical support from donor agencies 
such as the World Bank and AusAID. The modules of the MIS 
were developed to produce automated reports, such as non-
attendance  reports  from  compliance  verification  system, 
and to update the database to make payments accordingly. 
Given the load of data that flows between processes and 
the level of technical details necessary to implement the 
4Ps, these refinements helped DSWD in ensuring that the 
MIS can effectively support the operations of the 4Ps. As of 
December 2010, all software needed to operationalize the 
modules of the MIS became fully operational. Nonetheless, 
DSWD is continuously developing the system to ensure data 
security.  
Spot Checks
Monitoring  and  “spot  checks”  are  conducted  to  further 
improve  the  internal  quality  control  and  correction 
mechanisms in the 4Ps. One of the good practices emerging 
from the Latin American experience on CCT programs is to 
conduct periodic third-party ex-post reviews of the key aspects 
of the program design and implementation (spot checks). Spot 
checks are rapid evaluation instruments that seek to determine 
quality, effectiveness and efficiency of the program such as 
design,  operational  management,  institutional  structure, 
payments, and the monitoring system. Spot checks provide 
information about the execution of the different processes of 
the program, which can serve as the basis for a deeper analysis 
of the program operation at different levels and among the 
stakeholders  involved.10  Beyond  its  technical  merits,  spot 
checks are a key to enhancing the governance, transparency, 
and accountability of the 4Ps as they validate the range of 
players involved in the program delivery. Spot checks can also 
deter fraud and corruption as regional offices may fear being 
subjected to a spot check in the future. DSWD has adopted a 
methodology for spot checks for 4Ps, which was developed 
jointly  with  the  World  Bank.  The  spot  check  methodology 
includes  interviews  with  4Ps  beneficiaries,  Parent  Leaders, 
Municipal Links, health providers, school teachers, banks, local 
governments, regional offices, central office, as well as review 
of health facility records and school attendance records.11
10  For instance, a survey conducted by World Bank on attendance indica-
tors for health and education revealed the way the schools and health 
centers keep records.
11  The methodology was pilot-tested in February to May 2010 in Northern 
Samar to assess some of the major steps in the 4Ps process such as 
compliance with conditionalities, payment process, process of updates, 
education and health services provision, knowledge of beneficiaries 
about the program, among others. By November 2010, DSWD started do-
ing full spot checks every 6 months to monitor performance of the 4Ps.
Process Risk Mapping
A  Process  Risk  Mapping  (PRM)  exercise  helped  to 
identify  and  plug  vulnerability  leaks  in  key  stages  of 
4Ps implementation. The PRM identified and highlighted 
decision-points where program implementers at the national 
and  sub-national  levels  have  a  high  degree  of  discretion, 
unguided  by  project  procedures.  Conducted  jointly  with 
the World Bank in the four pilot areas in 2008, the PRM 
for  4Ps  mapped  out  decision-making  points  step-by-step 
for geographic selection, household targeting, registration, 
compliance  monitoring,  and  payment.  Wide  discretion 
opens up the potential for fraud or corruption. The findings 
of the PRM exercise served as inputs in devising measures 
to mitigate the risks in implementing the 4Ps. The review of 
4Ps implementation experience in the pilot phase identified 
points of vulnerability in the program delivery chain. The 
exercise found that most of the potential problems were 
attributed to the rapid scale-up of the program relative to the 
implementing capacity of DSWD and the readiness of systems 
in place to operationalize the 4Ps. Significant attention has 
since been placed on strengthening the staffing of key areas 
of program implementation.  
3.2.  Demand Side: Beneficiaries and  
       General Public
Strategic Communications
DSWD conducted activities to build support of the public and 
key opinion-makers for the 4Ps and ensure that information 
to support project implementation reached beneficiaries 
and relevant government staff. With assistance from the 
World Bank, DSWD formulated a strategic communications 
plan outlining activities targeted for various groups, including 
4Ps  beneficiaries,  non-government  organizations,  civil 
society, and media, among others. In terms of building public 
support, the plan includes orientation sessions on 4Ps to 
strategic audiences and channels for communications such 
as workshops, television appearances by key DSWD officials, 
posters and flyers, websites, etc. On the operational side, the 
plan supported specific behaviors, for instance: to ensure 
parental  awareness  of  the  CCT  program  conditionalities; 
to discourage pawning of the beneficiaries’ cash cards (or 
ATM  cards);  to  encourage  the  submission  of  grievances; 
to  prevent  municipal  and  city  mayors  from  adding  new 
conditions; and to stop bank staff from charging fees for cash 
withdrawals. Social marketing for 4Ps is intended to promote 
public  acceptance  and  win  the  support  of  key  players  to 
successfully implement the program on a broader and more 
sustainable  scale.  The  plan  is  yet  to  be  implemented  by 7 www.worldbank.org
DSWD but the agency is already undertaking some of these 
activities. Communication activities undertaken for 4Ps have 
significantly turned around public opinion on the program, 
having  initially  been  subjected  to  strong  public  criticism. 
Indeed the initial push on the communications strategy can 
be assessed as having been notably successful.  
Grievance Redress System (GRS) 
The GRS aims to capture, resolve, and analyze grievances 
about the 4Ps. The GRS design for 4Ps includes a grievance 
database, which tracks the nature, origin, location and status 
of complaints such as targeting errors, payment irregularities, 
fraud, and corruption. With World Bank’s technical support, 
DSWD drafted the GRS Manual, which is a comprehensive 
guide  for  consistent  handling  of  complaints.  As  stated 
in  the  manual,  multiple  channels  can  be  used  to  submit 
grievances—through the Municipal Link; direct to 4Ps offices; 
via an SMS hotline, email, letter, and fax; and drop boxes at 
the barangay level. Simple GRS forms have been developed 
for  wide  distribution  to  beneficiaries,  Parent  Leaders, 
Municipal Links, Barangay Captains, government officials and 
local NGOs. DSWD has established a two-person Grievance 
Redress Unit at the Central Level and designated grievance 
redress  staff  at  the  regional  level  to  resolve  complaints 
within a set timeframe stipulated in the GRS Manual. The 
Grievance Redress Unit is charged with preparing regular 
reports for DSWD management on the volume and status of 
grievances as a means of identifying systemic vulnerabilities 
in project implementation or design. In addition, there are 
communications programs (brochures, posters, training, etc) 
to educate the public and program staff on the existence of 
the GRS.
3.3.  Supply Side: DSWD
Integrity Development Review (IDR)
To help mitigate potential governance risks, DSWD conduct-
ed an IDR with a view to strengthening its department-wide 
control and accountability mechanisms. Along with the mas-
sive scale up of the program, government resources that go 
to 4Ps also increased significantly.12 Managing this increase 
and a project of the scale of the 4Ps has naturally strained   
the  capacity  of  the  department’s  integrity  systems.  Fur-
thermore, the size and nature of the 4Ps has raised DSWD’s 
  profile, including among parties who might wish to exploit 
12  According to DSWD, the total budget allocated for 4Ps In 2008 was 
about P1.3 billion. As the program expanded, the budget increased to 
P8.3 billion in 2009, P10 billion in 2010, and P21 billion in 2011. 
the program for political purposes. In light of these issues, 
DSWD conducted an agency-wide IDR in May to August 2009, 
which is a systematic assessment of vulnerabilities and cor-
ruption resistance mechanisms.13 The IDR applies two review 
tools—the Corruption Resistance Review (CRR) and the Cor-
ruption Vulnerability Assessment (CVA).14 The World Bank, 
together with a number of Philippine government agencies, 
worked to refine and revise the existing IDR assessment and 
survey  tools  to  be  more  evidenced-based,  objective,  and 
aligned the functions of the agency. Although a number of 
vulnerabilities were identified requiring management action, 
the IDR results were positive for DSWD.    
4.  Lessons Learned
Building a governance and anti-corruption element in the 
implementation of 4Ps has imparted several lessons:
•  It has been essential to take into account and embed GAC 
considerations throughout the design of 4Ps. The work 
has revealed the known fact that CCT programs intrinsically 
need strong GAC elements. The GAC activities undertaken 
have been critical to getting such a large program rapidly 
off the ground with success, especially in the challenging 
governance context of the Philippines. Moreover, it was 
precisely some of the GAC elements described above that 
made the program more acceptable to the populace that 
has been generally skeptical of the intent of government 
programs.
•  Strong  ownership  of  the  GAC  agenda  at  the  highest 
levels  of  DSWD,  and  in  particular  the  Secretary,  was 
key  to  successfully  embedding  GAC  measures  in  4Ps. 
The  centrality  of  close,  regular  senior  input  from  the 
government  has  been  a  significant  factor  in  building 
GAC into the 4Ps program design. Technical discussions 
between the World Bank team and DSWD were fruitful as 
they lead to concrete actions.
13  The IDR methodology was originally developed by the Development 
Academy of the Philippines (DAP) in collaboration with the Philippines’ 
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), drawing partially on tools formulat-
ed by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of New 
South Wales, Australia and the US Office of Budget and Management.  
14  The CRR provides a quick scan of integrity building and corruption pre-
vention measures used by the agency in its policies and operations, cov-
ering a range of different institutional functions such as procurement, 
financial management, human resource management and internal au-
dit Meanwhile, the CVA provides an assessment of the existing risks and 
vulnerabilities to corruption or fraud with respect to specific organiza-
tional functions or processes.Building Governance and Anti-Corruption in the Philippines’ Conditional Cash Transfer Program
•  Targeted  communication  has  been  integral  in  winning 
public support for the program. The program came under 
heavy criticism by influential opinion-makers early on, but 
now it has become the Government’s flagship anti-poverty 
program.  The  strong  public  support  for  the  program 
can  help  minimize  the  incentives  for  EFC,  given  the 
challenges in the local environment where 4Ps operates. 
The concerted actions under the strategic communication   
component of this task at the right time were critical in 
overcoming the early hurdle of skepticism and designing 
the communication strategy. 
• DSWD’s commitment to integrity enables the agency to 
face the implementation challenges of 4Ps. Despite the 
rampant corruption in the government, DSWD is among 
the government agencies that are committed to integrity.15 
Maintaining  adequate  controls  and  mechanisms  that 
can minimize corruption while implementing the 4Ps is 
crucial. This corresponds to the general interest of DSWD 
management to keep DSWD’s reputation as one of the best 
performing and least corrupt agencies in the government.
•  Most  GAC  activities  were  mainstreamed  through  the   
4Ps  operations.  The  GAC  measures  did  not  operate 
in  isolation,  but  were  delivered  in  parallel  with  the 
development of the program’s Operations Manuals and, 
therefore,  mainstreamed  through  the  operations  and 
generated impact.
15  Since 2006, DSWD has consistently ranked at the top, among national 
government agencies, in Pulse Asia’s quarterly polls measuring public 
awareness and agency performance. DSWD was rated higher than 99 
other government agencies in terms of compliance with requirements 
of  the  2008  Integrity  Development  Action  Plan—the  government’s 
score  card  for  rating  agency  corruption  prevention,  deterrence  and 
investigation efforts. Moreover, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission 
has  recognized  DSWD  above  all  others  for  achievement  in  integrity 
development and anti-corruption efforts since 2007. 
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